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‘There are no medium sized firms in Uzbekistan, only large and small ones.’ (Trader) 
 
The person who said this meant that it is difficult to operate private businesses except on the 
basis of a single individual or household because of high taxes and levels of regulation, and 
because of difficulties in obtaining large amounts of long term credit at reasonable rates of 
interest. Economic activity is seen as divided between the ‘state’ and ‘household’ sector. The 
former is made up of state or privatised former state enterprises subject to varying degrees to 
central government control, and also joint venture operations with foreign companies, while 
the household sector consists of individual traders, petty commodity agricultural production 
on household plots, and small businesses run on the basis of a single individual or household. 
Broadly adopting this distinction, Ilkhamov (2000) proposes a dual economy in Uzbekistan, 
made up of a command-type economy geared towards export or import substitution and 
controlled by central government, and a free market economy based on household 
production, with each sector operating according to its own logic while at the same time 
being interconnected. In this article I am interested in how state institutions or the state as an 
idea encompassing households, state institutions, and the national government administrative 
hierarchy, can be incorporated within local ideals of active participation in the community 
and modes of communal interaction, and I argue that in order to do this we have to discard 
dual economy models which place the state and household into separate spheres.  
   Mitchell (1998) has argued that the concept of the economy, referring to the structure or 
totality of relations of production, distribution and consumption of goods and services within 
a given territory, only emerged in the mid twentieth century. The economy as a reified, self 
contained entity is an ‘effect’ created out of the discursive practices which separate it from 
the state and the household. By placing the economy, state and household into different 
spheres of action, Marxist writers commenting on agrarian relations in Egypt and Turkey 
(Stauth 1990, Glavanis &Glavanis 1983, Aydin 1990) have asked the question of how 
‘peasant modes of production’ have survived within the overall context of capitalist relations 
in rural areas. Mitchell questions this distinction, arguing that a pre-colonial ‘natural’ peasant 
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economy, isolated from cash crop, commodity production, never existed in Egypt, and that it 
is impossible to distinguish subsistence and market oriented activity within the household. 
Sugar cane is cultivated as a cash crop using household labour and cattle raised for sale are 
bought using rotating credit arrangements with kin and neighbours. 
   Mitchell recognises that both the economy and the state are structural effects, but while he 
questions the distinction between the economy-as-effect and the household, he maintains this 
distinction when it comes to the state-as-effect and the household, or more accurately, the 
individual. He applies a Foucaudlian approach to argue that the modern individual is 
constructed as an ‘isolated, disciplined, receptive and industrious political subject’ within 
such state institutions as the army, schools, bureaucracy and factories. The state itself comes 
to be reified by individuals in this process as a structural effect which ‘orders, contains and 
controls them.’ 
The precise specification of space and function that characterise modern institutions, 
the coordination of these functions into hierarchical arrangements, the organisation of 
supervision and surveillance, the marking out of time into schedules and programs, all 
contribute to constructing a world that appears to consist not of a complex of social 
practices but of a binary order: on the one hand individuals and their activities, on the 
other an inert ‘structure’ that somehow stands apart from individuals, precedes them, 
and contains and gives a framework to their lives. (Mitchell 1999:89) 
   Although this approach can provide useful insights, it still maintains the state versus 
household, public versus private distinction which Mitchell criticises in relation to the 
economy, and does not allow us to address the question of how actors might incorporate the 
state within local systems of knowledge and value. To undertake this we need to approach the 
question at the local level, bottom up rather than top down, and from the viewpoint of 
households themselves.  
   This article is based on fieldwork carried out between August 1999 and July 2000 in a 
village in the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan. In the first section I critique dual economy 
models, particularly as they are applied to the Soviet Union, post-Soviet societies and 
Uzbekistan. In the second section I discuss how the household is constituted in the village in 
which I conducted research, and identify modes of interaction within it. I deal with this in 
some detail because it prepares the ground for the final section where I argue that these 
modes of interaction are extended beyond the household and can, in certain contexts, include 
state institutions as partners within projects of common interest to all participants.  
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Dual economy models 
A dual economy model has often been argued or assumed in accounts of the Soviet Union 
and the post-Soviet countries. The former is usually described as having had an official and a 
second or shadow economy, while post-Soviet countries have official and unofficial sectors. 
A common definition of the Soviet Union’s second economy is simply all unrecorded 
transactions1. Alternatively Grossman, employing more ideological criteria, defines the 
second economy as activity undertaken directly for private gain or which contravened the law 
(Grossman 1977:25). This definition includes activities which were legally tolerated, such as 
agricultural production on private plots or teachers offering private lessons, but which were 
ideologically alien to the Soviet system2, as well as illegal activities, ranging from workers 
using resources from the workplace for private gain (earning levyye dengi or earnings ‘on the 
side’), to ‘underground entrepreneurs’ who produced on a substantial scale, often operating 
behind the façade of a state enterprise.  
   Those who employ a dual economy model, however, usually acknowledge that it is 
impossible to distinguish between legal and illegal activities, as legally rendered services, the 
private sale of goods produced on household plots, or domestically produced crafts, often 
involved the use of resources illegally appropriated from the state sector. Moreover, they 
acknowledge that the official and second economy were interdependent to the extent that one 
could not exist without the other. Many of the resources employed in private production and 
exchange were obtained from the state sector. Conversely, enterprise managers relied on 
informal channels involving personal connections and bribery to gain access to inputs 
necessary to fulfil state plans, and often employed a person known as a tolkach (pusher) who 
was adept at gaining resources in this way. Humphrey describes how collective farms in 
Siberia tried to produce and accumulate ‘manipulable resources’, by which she means goods 
produced by the farm but not registered in the official accounts and thus outside the control of 
state authorities, and also resources over which it had a certain amount of discretion as to its 
use. These could included land in the form of personal plots and payments in kind which 
were offered to workers as an added incentive to fulfil state plans. Manipulable resources 
were used to exchange for defitsitnyye (scarce or shortage) goods needed to fulfil the state 
plan or sold for cash. They were also used to gain political credit with the local administration 
by selling the surplus to farms within the raion which had not managed to fulfil their plan, 
and so ensure that the district plan as a whole was fulfilled (Humphrey 1998:195 onwards). 
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   Since it is often impossible to distinguish whether a particular transaction was part of the 
official or shadow economy, these labels can only be notional definitions or ‘ideal types’ 
referring to aspects of a single transaction rather than a model suggesting that the economy 
really was made up of two sectors. If, like Kotkin, we acknowledge that the formal and 
shadow economies really were one economy with two aspects3, then we must discard the dual 
economy model and find an alternative approach to describe what was going on. 
   The division of post-socialist economies into formal and informal sectors is similarly 
problematic. The informal sector is usually defined as economic activity which takes place 
outside public regulation, a definition which stresses the criminal nature of the informal 
economy4. Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer offer a model classifying countries into two 
distinct groups. 
In one, the government offers a sufficiently attractive combination of tax rates, 
regulations, and public goods that most firms choose to stay in the official sector. In 
this group, government revenues suffice to provide the public goods, and the 
unofficial sector is small because the government outcompetes it. In the other group, 
the government does not offer firms a sufficiently attractive combination of tax rates, 
regulations, and public goods to keep them operating officially, and hence many of 
them end up in the large unofficial sector, which offers a more attractive combination. 
The government budget in these countries does not suffice to offer more public goods, 
and hence the unofficial sector wins the competition for firms. (Johnson, Kaufmann 
and Shleifer 1997:169) 
Although they allow that a single firm might engage in both official and unofficial activities, 
they nevertheless present the economy as consisting of two almost hermetically sealed sectors 
with both sectors being represented in a single firm. Such a firm enjoys public goods such as 
recourse to the courts to enforce contracts with respect to their legal activities, but must 
resorts to bribery and private protection or enforcement agencies for their informal 
transactions. In the context of Uzbekistan, however, legal and illegal transactions are both 
present in the strategies of businesses, and in household and individual income generating 
activities, to such an extent that it is not useful to attempt to classify a single transaction as 
belonging to the formal or informal sector.  
   The case of Tohirjon is typical and illustrates this clearly. Tohirjon, a school teacher in the 
village where I conducted my research, receives a salary of 10,000 Sum (US$15) per month. 
He has 26 sotok (1 sotka, plural: sotok, is equal to 0.01 hectares) of land in the form of 
 5
household plots, most of which he obtained illegally from the kolkhoz, and from which he 
gains about 19,000 Sum (US$27) per month in products for sale and household consumption. 
He buys fertiliser from the manager of the kolkhoz warehouse, who sells it illegally, and hires 
kolkhoz tractor drivers to till his fields. In addition to this, he teaches private lessons to 
students preparing to sit the higher education entrance exams, for which he gets about 3000 
Sum (US$5) a month, though this income varies considerably from month to month 
depending on the number of students he has. He has paid a neighbour in the village who 
works in the photocopy room of a large foreign joint venture company to make copies of 
textbooks for use in his preparation courses and for sale to his students, and he was also 
planning to make and sell cribs or cheat-sheets for students to use in the entrance tests. 
Although his household plot production, teaching salary and private courses are legal they 
often depend on illegal transactions to make them possible. The household plot production 
would not be possible without the illegal sales of land, fertiliser, and tractor services, and the 
income from the private lessons is tied up with resources illegally appropriated from the joint 
venture firm. With the exception of the teaching salary, it is impossible to place any particular 
activity in the formal or informal sector.  
   If it is not possible to distinguish between an official and an unofficial sector, what of 
Ilkhamov’s distinction between the export or import substituting and the household 
production sectors. This model is very useful for understanding certain aspects of the 
relationship between state, kolkhoz and rural households, particularly when viewed from a top 
down perspective. Despite its formal status as a non-state cooperative with decisions being 
made by its members, the reality of the decision making process means that the kolkhoz has 
historically acted as if it were a state institution. During the Soviet period the central 
government issued production plans which originated in the planning ministries in Moscow 
and were passed down through the Republican administration in Tashkent and the oblast 
(regional) level. As far as the main crop, cotton, was concerned, the state was the sole buyer 
and also the monopoly supplier for most inputs, such as water, power, farm machinery and 
equipment, and chemical fertiliser.  
   Since independence the kolkhoz has continued to act as a state institution, despite a number 
of reforms in the organisation of agricultural production. The government continues to issue 
procurement plans for cotton and wheat and compulsory quotas for the distribution of sowing 
land. It remains the monopoly buyer of raw cotton and  the monopoly supplier of most non-
labour inputs through state controlled organisations or banks5 (Ilkhamov 1998 & 2000, World 
Bank 1999, Khan 1995). Even though, by law, private dehqon farmers (established since 
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independence, these are private farmers who are granted from 1 to 10  hectares of land or 
sometimes more on a rental basis) have the right to make their own planting decisions, they 
are often forced to grow cotton or wheat as part of the overall plan for the kolkhoz from which 
their land was granted. Since the state procurement plan for the kolkhoz is not reduced when 
it grants land to a dehkon farmer, it only grants the land if the farmer agrees to plant crops as 
part of this plan (TACIS Regional Agricultural Development Project, and my own 
observation). The real aim of the reforms seems to have been to shift the financial 
responsibility for agricultural enterprises from the state budget to the enterprises themselves, 
thus the state can maintain control of the production of strategically important crops, while 
minimising its financial burden (Ilkhamov 1998:544) 
   The kolkhoz and the household could be viewed as two separate economies, the former 
having a strong command economy character, controlled by central government and directed 
towards the eventual generation of foreign exchange, and the latter geared to household 
subsistence and petty commodity production for the domestic market and more or less 
operating on free market principles. In common with other dual economy models, however, 
this is based on a distinction which cannot be sustained when viewed at the local level. It is 
not flexible enough to cover state and privatised state enterprises which are not engaged in 
production for export or import substitution, and also the non-manufacturing state sector such 
as schools and hospitals. Neither does it take into account production within households of 
goods for sale abroad and the cross border trading activities. Most importantly, by viewing 
the kolkhoz and households as separate sectors which interact as if with external entities, this 
model does not allow us to see how the kolkhoz and other state institutions can be ‘localised’ 
within modes of communal interaction. At the local level, as the case of Tohirjon shows, the 
kolkhoz, school, household plot etc. are all incorporated into his income generating strategies, 
and distinctions between formal and informal economy, command economy and free market, 
state and household begin to break down. In order to see how the state can be incorporated 
within local modes of interaction, we need to view this interaction at the point of local 
contact, the household and the village. 
 
The household 
It is difficult to make generalisations about what constitutes a household as numerous 
exceptions can be found to any ‘typical’ form that is identified. Moreover, as Kandiyoti 
(1999) has pointed out, residence in one house or compound cannot be used as a definition of 
a household in rural Uzbekistan because several separate households may constitute a single 
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unit of consumption or production or, conversely, a single household may contain more than 
one independent family. I will begin by outlining the main characteristics of households in 
the village where I conducted my research and then discuss modes of interaction within it. 
   Rural households in Uzbekistan have been described as patriarchal and extended with 
brides (kelin: from the Uzbek verb kelmok: to come) moving to the household of their 
husband’s family (Lobacheva N. 1999, Poliakov S. 1992, Monogarova P. 1969). The married 
couple are settled either in separate one or two room structures in the courtyard or in a single 
room in the main house. These extended households usually eat their meals together (living 
bir qozon: one cooking pot), and pooling the incomes of all individuals into one household 
budget (bir kassa) which is controlled by the, typically, male head of household.  
   Residence of married sons with their children within the main parental compound (katta 
eshik: main door) is a temporary situation. One son, typically the youngest, will continue 
living in the katta eshik with his family, looking after his parents and inheriting the property 
on their death. It is the responsibility of the main household to build a separate house for the 
other sons, though this can take many years, depending on the availability of land from the 
kolkhoz and other material considerations. Even after a family has settled away from the main 
household, they may continue to live bir qozon,  bir kassa, or both, for some years, with the 
land belonging to the various households being worked in common and the head of the katta 
eshik making all major decisions. I shall refer to this type of arrangement as a ‘satellite’ 
household, as opposed to an extended household where all the separate families live in one 
compound. 
   One principle, which lies at the heart of decisions to live bir qozon or bir kassa, is the 
responsibility of parents, or the katta eshik, to pay for the life cycle rituals of their children; 
circumcision feasts for boys, wedding celebrations, and building a house for married sons. I 
calculated the expenditure on one wedding which was described as above average. The 
bride’s side spent over 950,000 Sum (US$1350) on the dowry, furniture and the wedding 
feast while the groom’s family spent 685,000 Sum (US$ 970) on gifts to the kelin’s family, 
clothes for the groom and the wedding feast itself. This represents a very substantial 
expenditure6 and households start collecting items for dowries while their daughters are still 
young children. People estimated that it cost between US$500 and US$1000 to build a decent 
two room house, the minimum acceptable for a newly established household, while a 
circumcision toi (feast) could cost about $200, the same as the wedding toi but without the 
substantial gifts to the bride or groom’s family and the dowry. Another large expense is 
obtaining higher education, which can entail large outlays on private courses to pass 
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university entrance tests and sometimes bribes as well. A study commissioned by the World 
Bank (1999) which surveyed people’s attitudes to poverty and its causes found that 
respondents considered it a parent’s responsibility to arrange for their children’s weddings 
and provide them with a secure start in life, which means a house, household goods and 
education beyond secondary school. They included  the ability to do this as a criterion in 
defining whether a person was rich or well to do, and cited as one of the causes of 
impoverishment the need to meet the costs of weddings. Those who had already taken care of 
this before the worsening economic situation since independence were considered to be in an 
advantageous position, they could ‘relax’. 
   While the need to provide for circumcision celebrations, weddings and housing is an 
important factor in decisions to remain bir kassa or bir qozon, other factors are also 
important. Levels of poverty have dramatically increased since independence. Not only have 
formal wages decreased, or ceased all together in the case of kolkhoz workers, but prices of 
consumer goods have increased so people’s buying power is much reduced. In addition, 
medical care and other services, which were freely provided in the past, must now be paid 
for. Even though medical care and hospital treatment is officially free of charge, doctors and 
nurses often demand substantial bribes before treating patients. A number of writers have 
identified reciprocal exchange through informal networks of kin, neighbours and friends as a 
strategy for coping with material hardship as well as gaining access to scarce resources7. 
Maintaining a united income with separate households is one of the strategies used by 
villagers to pool labour and to share costs and risks. Moreover, in a situation where access to 
credit from banks or other ‘formal’ institutions is impossible for most people, the joint 
income from extended or satellite households is an important resource.  I came across many 
cases where one household member started a business, for example a shop or a flour mill, 
using joint household income to pay for the start up costs.  
   As Kandiyoti (1999) observes, household composition is a dynamic state, changing with 
time and circumstances. Three brothers in the village all normally lived completely 
independently, but while they worked seasonally in Kazakhstan as house builders, their wives 
and children, who remained in the village, once again became bir qozon with the men’s 
parental compound, which also sold off a bull to pay for the extra expenditure on food. 
Moreover, the main household sometimes selectively chooses which members to retain tied 
to the common budget and which to make independent according to need and material 
constraints. A former truck driver and trader I interviewed reported that after he had moved 
into a separate house site his parents kept him bir kassa with the main compound for ten 
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years, until they had married off and settled all their children, because he made a good 
income from his official salary and trading activities. At the same time, his elder brother, after 
living with his family in the main household for 5 years, was immediately made independent 
when he moved to a separate house because of his low income and large family8. 
   Rather than try to define the boundaries of the household, a more productive approach is to 
recognise that a household is a dynamic set of relationships rather than a fixed entity, and to 
identify the value systems or principles which shape these relationships. In the context of 
village households, the dominant principle is living bir kassa and bir qozon. The household 
acts as a sort of ‘holding company’, coordinating the projects of its various members, pooling 
incomes and providing capital. The actual composition of a household, who is included and 
the degree to which members live bir kassa and bir qozon, is contingent upon the needs at a 
particular time, which might include the obligation of the main household to provide for the 
life cycle rituals of its members, education expenses, the need to raise capital for income 
generating projects an so on. Alongside this, another principle operates, that each member 
contributes what they are able to the common budget and is allotted from it what they are 
judged to need, irrespective of their contribution. The household as a whole is the unit of 
consumption, income and expenditure and inequalities as to the contributions and benefits of 
individual members are not considered. Ikramjon, the second oldest son in a household, had 
apprenticed with a leather tanner and then set up on his own. He manages the business in 
terms of day to day decisions independently from the rest of the household, through his 
brothers contribute labour and the business is financially integrated within the household 
budget.  During my fieldwork, he decided he wanted to enter the Law Institute in Tashkent 
and so increased the scale of his leather tanning operations, taking on more apprentices. He 
continued to hand over all the profits from this to the household budget controlled by his 
father and told me that when the time comes his family would give him the money he needs. 
Any excess cash generated at the present time will probably be used to buy cattle, a savings 
and investment strategy9. Ikramjon does not consider the household budget as a ‘bank’ where 
the money he contributes now can be drawn out at a later time on a directly proportional 
basis, but he knows that the household wealth has to be built up in order to finance his studies 
in the future.  
   In actuality access to resources is often unequal, and Kandiyoti (1999) has pointed out the 
inferior access of women to money within rural Uzbek households. In my own field work I 
noticed that men attended community celebrations or special meals with other male friends or 
colleagues, where the quality of food was much higher than normal meals at home, much 
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more frequently than women, a fact men are often not aware of. While inequality of access to 
resources is an important issue in itself, here I am concerned with how modes of interaction 
within the household can be extended to wider contexts and identifying basic principles is 
more important for this than actual inequalities as to how the needs of various household 
members are assessed. 
 
Spheres of communal participation 
A villager told me that a household was a small mahalla10, referring to the fact that his eldest 
son who lives separately continues to contribute part of his income to the parental household. 
The villager regarded the mahalla as an arena of communal interaction and cooperation 
which he could use as an analogy for relations within his own household. The collection of 
articles edited by Carsten (2000) use the term ‘relatedness’ to encompass emotional and 
social ties beyond the bounds conventionally defined in the study of kinship relations. 
Stafford’s contribution is particularly relevant to my topic. He describes the ‘cycle of 
laiwang’, the building up of relatedness within a community among people not related by 
kinship through mutual assistance, reciprocal exchanges of money at wedding ceremonies, 
through ‘small actions and interactions’. He argues that laiwang can be characterised as an 
extension of the ‘cycle of yang’, the system of mutual obligations between parents and 
children within the household, which similarly entails the transfer of money and the sharing 
of food. In both laiwang and yang, transfers create an obligation on the part of the recipient to 
return them at a later date, though not necessarily in the same form.  
   While Stafford’s account extends modes of interaction within households to wider contexts, 
laiwang and yang are based on a form of ‘balanced’ or ‘generalised’ reciprocity, to use 
Sahlins’ terms, which are not a suitable idiom for describing the bir qozon, bir kassa relations 
I have described. Moreover, I argue that ‘relatedness’ is not necessarily created through 
exchange, but that belonging to a social unit itself carries with it certain modes of interaction, 
and that the composition of the social unit is contextually determined by shared interest.  
   When talking about interaction beyond the household in rural Uzbekistan, it is important to 
distinguish between contexts where participants contribute and benefit equally, and where 
contributions and benefits relate to ability and need. An example of the former would be the 
chyornaya kassa, a form of rotating credit group where members contribute a fixed amount to 
a common fund at regular intervals and take turns to receive it. The groups I came across in 
the village all consisted of work colleagues, and the amount to be contributed was usually 
calculated in terms of kilos of beef in order to compensate for high inflation, though in one 
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group the ‘target’ each month was the amount needed to buy a certain television set. A 
gathering which shares some of the characteristics of the chyornaya kassa is the gap, though 
this has a more social basis. A gap is an occasion when a group of work colleagues, relatives, 
classmates from university or school etc. regularly meet over a meal, taking turns as host or 
gathering in a restaurant. In some groups, money may be collected from participants and 
given to the host. This may be just enough to pay for the food or it may provide a little extra 
for the host, in which case the gap also serves as a form of rotating credit group, and this is 
particularly true for women’s gaps11. While capital may be raised in this way, the gap is 
primarily an occasion of communal consumption and sociability, and as with the chyornaya 
kassa participants contribute equally. 
   In contrast to interaction on the basis of strictly equal contributions, in certain contexts 
participants within a project contribute only according to their means and benefit equally, 
irrespective of the size of that contribution. The year before I arrived in the village, Kamol-
aka, the father of the largest private farmer in the village, organised the asphalting of a main 
road. He had previously tried unsuccessfully to persuade the oqsoqol, mulla and elders of his 
mahalla to hand over money raised for the renovation of the mosque, but which had not been 
spent because the mosque was closed by the government authorities in response to Islamic 
extremist activities12. When they refused, he raised money from households along the road 
(Kamol-aka himself is a member of one of these) and from residents of two other mahallas 
who also benefited from the access the road provided. Each household contributed what it 
could afford. Kamol-aka contributed 10,000 Sum, a wealthy pharmacist gave 5000, and 
typical contributions from other households were 2000 Sum or less. He obtained tractors from 
the kolkhoz and negotiated with a local factory for materials. While I was conducting my 
research, he was planning to organise the surfacing of other roads in the mahalla and was 
again trying to drum up support from residents for using the money raised for the mosque. He 
had already persuaded the kolkhoz authorities to provide tractors and fuel and pay the drivers’ 
salaries. All participants in the project, including the kolkhoz, contributed according to their 
means while all benefited equally from the outcome. 
   Money is not the only medium through which interaction beyond the household takes place 
on this basis. Hashar, the contribution of labour to community projects or the production 
efforts of other households without monetary reward, is common and occurs in a variety of 
contexts. A common occasion is house building. Villagers claim that during the Soviet period 
the whole mahalla or village would cooperate in building residential houses and this was 
organised by the oqsoqol of the mahalla where the house was being built. Nowadays only 
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people who maintain close social relations to those building the house will contribute labour. 
Villagers said that people have less time to spare, perhaps because it takes much more time 
and effort to make a living now than during the Soviet period. Hashar is also used for work 
on private plots, and again those participating usually have a close social relationship with the 
plot owner. The ‘host’ of the hashar will usually provide a meal and if crops are harvested 
participants may be given a share, though this is not calculated in proportion to the work 
done. This is true even when the hashar  is organised to harvest crops for market sale. While 
the norm is that participants contribute labour for free, I came across some cases where such 
labour was paid for, though at rates well below the market rate.  
   Hashar might seem to belong to a different category from the road building project, in that 
only one party benefits while others contribute labour. However, this is not simply a system 
for the reciprocal exchange of labour, ‘I will help you with your harvest and you will help me 
with mine’. The sisters of one man, Muratbey, who had married and moved into their 
husbands’ household, regularly worked on his plots with their children, while their brother 
did not reciprocate by working on their plots. One sister lived in a town and her household 
did not have any cultivable land. Moreover, Muratbey’s brother’s son also worked on his 
plots while his own children were too young to do the same on his brother’s land in return. At 
other times, however, Muratbey had helped his sisters  in a number of ways. He give one of 
his sisters enough money to organise the paperwork involved in obtaining a new job, and he 
negotiated for the rental of some land from the kolkhoz on behalf of another, as he was on 
better terms with the brigadier responsible. Hashar is only one part of a wider relationship 
based on common interest and mutual aid which encompasses not only kin, but also former 
classmates, neighbours and others. 
   It is possible to identify a sphere of interaction, including the household but also extending 
beyond it in certain contexts, which is marked by principles of communal participation, 
contribution and benefit. These spheres, which I shall call ‘spheres of communal 
participation’, may be fairly constant through time, such as the household, or actualised for a 
limited period as in the case of a road building project. The participants within the sphere are 
similarly determined by the nature of the project in question, and the kolkhoz, other state 
institutions and the state itself can be included in certain contexts. Villagers expressed the 
view that the kolkhoz was a communal resource, an institution which is morally obligated to 
look after the general wellbeing of the community rather than be for the benefit of specific 
individuals. One villager disapproved of private farms because they took land away from the 
kolkhoz and the general community and placed it under the control of a single household. 
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Another asserted that the kolkhoz was only a collective in name, not in reality, since it did not 
have enough income to supply the needs of the people and could not pay salaries. It was not a 
real collective because its administration appropriated all the income for themselves. ‘We are 
also part of the kolkhoz’, said one teacher when he told me he was using a kolkhoz combine to 
process wheat grown on his own household plots.  
   In its past and present activities, the kolkhoz often realised this role. During the Soviet 
period the kolkhoz provided the village with roads, electricity and gas, and built the schools, 
while the central government paid teachers’ salaries and provided the equipment. People 
definitely felt that the kolkhoz had provided these things rather than the central government. 
Now, even though it does not have the resources to provide or maintain the village 
infrastructure as was its responsibility in Soviet times, it still supports the village as a whole 
where it can. Land for private plots comes from kolkhoz land and is granted to anyone who is 
a permanent resident whether they work for the kolkhoz or not, and it also provides the water 
which irrigates these plots free of charge. In the past the kolkhoz has also given land for the 
building of communal structures such as mosques and graveyards. I have already described 
how the kolkhoz participates in community projects such as the asphalting of a dirt road, 
something it should have been responsible for but lacks the resources to carry out on its own, 
and the kolkhoz sponsors cultural and sporting events, though on a much reduced scale than 
in the past. During my fieldwork it contributed to the prize money for a football competition, 
and organised a concert in the yard of one of the schools.  
   Social services such as schools and health care facilities can also fall into this sphere. 
Wealthy individuals often financially support such institutions, much as the kolkhoz did in the 
past, and when the village school approached parents for a contribution of 100 Sum each to 
carry out some repairs, a wealthy private cattle farmer and the largest trader in the village 
each contributed 10,000 Sum. In a similar way, each household contributed to the renovation 
of a health centre in the village. Private sponsorship of state-provided social services is not 
confined to the village. In a nearby town I visited a school which was sponsored by the 
owners of two local factories, one of whom had also renovated another school himself.  
   The state, as an encompassing idea connecting households with state institutions, such as 
schools and hospitals, and the hierarchy of government administration, can conceptually be 
included in the sphere of communal participation, though more as an extension of principle 
than in practical activity. I was present during a conversation between a knife maker and a 
teacher at the village school where the knife maker regretted that he had never done any work 
for ‘society’ (jamiya uchun), by which he meant working for the kolkhoz, school or other 
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state or social institution, but had always worked privately for himself. When later I brought 
up the subject with the teacher, he said that some people in the village only worked for 
themselves, they only kept cows, paid no tax to the state and didn’t care about the people 
around them. Keeping livestock is a savings and investment strategy which most people 
engage in, including the teacher. However, most of the work involved, from growing the 
maize for fodder to feeding and selling the animals, can be undertaken within the household 
without recourse to outside help. I think the teacher was using the keeping of livestock as a 
metaphor for income generating activities which have little benefit for the wider community 
and entail minimal interaction with it. It is also interesting that both the knife maker and the 
teacher viewed working in a state institution and paying taxes as contributing to society. In 
return for taxes the state pays salaries, pensions and other benefits. 
   A central feature of spheres of communal participation is that the aims of the project around 
which it is mobilised address the material interests of participants, and the closer these aims 
are, the greater is the sense of being part of a single consumption, production or expenditure 
unit. A group of households participating in the building of a road form a much more distinct 
group in terms of their actual contributions of time, labour and money, than the more 
generalised sentiments that the kolkhoz ought to function for the good of the whole 
community, or the even further generalised notion that paying taxes or working in the ‘social 
sector’ is a way of contributing to the state as imagined as the larger, encompassing  
community. The kolkhoz or state institutions such as schools and health centres are included 
within the sphere of participation in a much more concrete manner when they are the object 
of a project of more immediate benefit to participants, as in cases where parents are asked to 
contribute to renovation work of a school, or when they are one of the participating agents in 
a project, for example when the kolkhoz provides tractors and fuel to transport the material to 
build a road. 
   At the same time, material interest is not the only thing which unites participants. Spheres 
of communal participation are actualised within a social context which values active 
participation within a community. Rassudova (1969) shows how common material interest 
was combined with membership in a single social unit in the area around Samarkand in the 
19th century. She writes that a number of villages watered from a single main canal formed a 
water managing unit, electing a representative to supervise the watering of fields, the buying 
and selling of land, cleaning and maintenance of the main canal and crop rotation. Each 
village contributed labour for any necessary work in proportion to the water it received. The 
villages making up such a unit were known as qozonsherik (sharing one cooking pot) 
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reflecting the fact that they constituted a social unit as well, jointly owning large cooking pots 
for communal feasts and mutually attending each other’s tois. The spatial distribution of 
cultivated plots reproduced settlement patterns, so residential neighbours would also cultivate 
neighbouring fields. Each household cultivated their land independently but pooled animal 
power and labour when necessary with cultivators of neighbouring plots, for example at 
harvest time or for ploughing. This exchange of labour was also known as hashar, for which 
no monetary payment was given. 
   The kolkhoz and other state institutions took over the regulation of the irrigation 
infrastructure and the distribution of land from the pre-Revolutionary local community 
organisations, which in the past encompassed all local users within a cooperative productive 
and social unit. At the same time, however, the ideal of active participation in the community 
has remained and is actualised in a number of ways. I attended an iftar in the village, the first 
meal after sunset to break the fast during Ramadan. The host invited the mahalla oqsoqol, the 
mulla and other older men from the two neighbouring streets and the reason he gave for 
organising the meal was to show respect to those attending, to repay the times his father (now 
deceased) had attended similar gatherings in his old age, and because he had not held a toi-
like celebration for the past five years since his youngest sister’s marriage. Households 
sometimes host feasts for their neighbours in the absence of a recent marriage or circumcision 
toi as a way of ‘paying back’ for the celebrations they have attended, and of participating in 
the social life of the mahalla. 
   People earn respect in the village through contributing to the community around them. Rich 
people are expected to contribute more than the less well off, but the fact of the contribution 
is more important than the actual amount. This contribution does not have to be financial, and 
is more about fully taking part in community life. The teacher who talked about working for 
society, said that for him this meant meeting and interacting with colleagues at school and 
helping his neighbours where he can. He mentioned that he had a neighbour who was too 
poor to contribute financially to common projects but was always ready with advice, meaning 
that he was prepared to participate within the community, and was therefore respected. A 
successful trader was respected because he was always ready to contribute, whereas a private 
cattle farmer was criticised for only having started involving himself in the community since 
he went on pilgrimage to Mecca ten years ago, before which he just looked out for himself 
and his family. When the villagers who just kept cows are criticised, it was not just that they 
do not pay taxes, but more importantly that they do not care about the people around them, 
they ‘only think about their cows’ and do not participate in the social life of the community. 
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   There is an ideal of active participation within the community, where the level of 
contribution is less important than the fact of making a contribution, and where each is 
expected to contribute according to their ability. In order to be realised in action, within 
spheres of communal participation, a degree of shared material interest is important, and the 
household is the domain where the sense of shared interest is most completely experienced. 
While participants in a road building project may constitute a single unit within the limited 
context of that project, household members are part of a temporally continuous project which 
encompasses the whole life experiences of its members. Individual state institutions can be 
incorporated within spheres of communal participation, either as a participant alongside 
households, as in the case of the kolkhoz within the road building project, or as an object of a 
project. The state can also be incorporated, if not in practical action, then as the imagined, 
encompassing community within which individuals and households are expected to actively 
participate through paying taxes and working in ‘social’ institutions such as the kolkhoz or the 
school. 
 
Conclusion 
I recognise that as far as the relationship between households and state institutions are 
concerned, or how the state is imagined by individuals in rural Uzbekistan,  the incorporation 
of the state within spheres of participation is only part of the story. In other contexts the state 
may indeed exist as a reified entity external to the individual, as Mitchell argues, and 
Ilkhamov’s distinction between a central government controlled command-type economy and 
a market oriented household economy is useful for understanding much of the relationship 
between government authorities, the kolkhoz and rural households. However, the state is 
imagined by individuals in a multidimensional way, and while it may be imagined and treated 
as an external entity, perhaps to be resisted or avoided, state institutions can also be 
incorporated within local systems of value. Dual economy models make a distinction between 
formal and informal sectors, the public and the private, which draws boundaries around the 
state, household and economy, and places each in a separate domain. When viewed at the 
level of local interactions these distinctions break down, and we can see how state institutions 
can be drawn into local modes of interaction, not as external entities but as participating 
partners. 
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1
 ‘In contrast to the legitimate market/black market model, the Soviet state operated as an economy that 
commonly had two kinds of transactions within it: the official dealings, announced and recorded, and those of 
the second economy, which were not. This meant that the second economy was virtually co-extensive with the 
whole economy, and involved almost the whole population, to at least some extent. In addition, to the legal 
economy operating by means of controls, plans, directives, quotas and the like, the second economy made quasi-
market arrangements available for the whole of society in respect to at least part of the material needs of the 
people.’ (Kurkchiyan 2000:84) 
2
 This is also the definition used by Sik (1992) who defines the second economy as activity outside the socialist 
sector. 
3
 ‘The shadow economy was not an independent entity but a corollary to the official economy; it was the shadow 
economy that permitted the official economy to function, and visa versa. The two economies were mutually 
dependent and shaded off one into the other; separated, each would have ceased to exist. Put simply, there was 
really one economy with a dual aspect: some activities were legal, others were not; some illegal activities were 
condoned, but not all. And the determination more often than not was arbitrary.’ (Kotkin 1995:274) 
4
 ‘The informal economy has been reduced to activities that cannot be called by any names other than cheating 
and corruption – activities such as tax evasion, stealing from employers, illegal contracts, bribing politicians and 
officials, money laundering, and so forth.’ (Kurkchiyan 2000:96) 
5
 Although the banks granting credit to agricultural enterprises are officially non-state their financing comes 
from the State Central Bank which controls their operations. 
6
 I conducted a survey of incomes of 20 households in the village. This was not a random sample but represented 
a range of income levels and occupations. In this sample, combined household incomes (including official 
salaries, pensions and other transfer payments from the state, income from agricultural activity, other businesses 
and trade) ranged from 18,500 to 119,000 Sum per month. 
7
 On the use of networks as a coping strategy in situations of material hardship,  Kandiyoti (1998) writes about 
women’s gaps (rotating credit societies) in Uzbekistan, Hoodfar (1997) and Singerman (1995) describe the use 
of informal networks in Cairo, and Ledeneva (1998) describes blat networks or relations in accessing scarce 
goods and services in Soviet Russia. 
8
 Kandiyoti (1999:504) gives a similar example of a widow living on the low income provided by a pension who 
decided not to share her cooking pot with her elder son and his family since she could no longer afford to feed 
them all, but instead remained bir qozon only with her younger disabled son and his family. 
9
 Raising cattle for beef is a very popular method of saving. While the price of most agricultural produce 
fluctuates dramatically from season to season, the price of beef usually rises steadily and keeps pace with 
inflation. 
10
 A mahalla is a territorially based residential and social unit, headed by an oqsoqol chosen by residents. The 
oqsoqol, mulla, and older, respected residents play an important role in settling disputes within the mahalla, 
upholding moral and social norms, and supervise and officiate at communal celebrations such as wedding tois. 
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The mahalla collectively owns cooking equipment, crockery, tables etc. for use at these celebrations purchased 
from contributions from residents. See Basilov (1996) for an account of mahallas in a Fergana Valley village. 
11
 See Kandiyoti (1998) for an account of women’s gaps. 
12
 After 1985 and the relaxing of restrictions on religious freedoms mosques in the village were reopened and 
new ones were built, and mosque attendance increased further after independence. After incidents involving 
Islamic opposition elements in 1995 in the nearby city of Namangan all the mosques in the village except one 
were once more closed, or rather, the authorities told people not to attend them although they were not actually 
boarded up. In the case of the mosque I am writing about, villagers told me that the raion authorities closed the 
mosque on the pretext that it did not have a proper gas and electricity meter. Money was raised from mahalla 
residents to remedy this and a delegation was sent to Andijan (the seat of the viloyat (provincial) government) 
and to the capital Tashkent to petition for the reopening of the mosque but this was refused. It is this money 
which the father of the cattle farmer wanted to use for the road surfacing project. 
